Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study by Alvin E. Roth et al.
American Economic Association
Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An
Experimental Study
Author(s): Alvin E. Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Shmuel Zamir
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Dec., 1991), pp. 1068-1095
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006907
Accessed: 07/12/2010 11:19
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aea.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
American Economic Review.
http://www.jstor.orgBargaining  and Market  Behavior  in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, 
Pittsburgh,  and Tokyo:  An Experimental  Study 
By ALVIN E. ROTH,  VESNA  PRASNIKAR, MASAHIRO OKUNO-FUJIWARA, 
AND SHMUEL ZAMIR* 
In an experiment  comparing  related two-person  bargaining  and multiperson 
market environments  in Israel, Japan, the United States, and Yugoslavia, 
market outcomes converged  to  equilibrium  everywhere,  and there were no 
payoff-relevant  differences  among  countries.  However,  bargaining  outcomes  were 
everywhere  different  from the equilibrium  predictions  (both in observed  agree- 
ments and in the substantial  frequency  of observed  disagreements),  and sub- 
stantial differences  were observed  among countries.  Because of  the way the 
experiment  was designed,  the fact that the market  behavior  is the same in all 
countries  supports  the hypothesis  that the differences  in bargaining  behavior 
among countries  are not due to differences  in languages,  currencies,  or experi- 
ments  but may tentatively  be attributed  to cultural  differences.  (JEL C78, C90, 
C92) 
This  paper  reports  an experiment  in which 
data were collected for a simple one-period 
bargaining  situation (an ultimatum game) 
and a  simple one-period market in  four 
countries:  Israel, Japan, the United States, 
and Yugoslavia.  The experiment  had three 
substantive  goals:  (i) to compare  behavior  in 
related  bargaining and  market environ- 
ments; (ii) to compare  behavior  in very dif- 
ferent subject pools in order to assess the 
effect that subject-pool  differences  may  have 
and to assess how this effect may differ in 
the  bargaining  and market environments; 
and (iii) to use such differences  as may be 
found between subject pools to  test  and 
refine hypotheses about the  out-of-equi- 
librium behavior that has frequently  been 
observed in bargaining  games of the kind 
examined  here. 
In addition, a major  methodological  goal 
of the present investigation  was to give us 
the opportunity  to  learn from experience 
how to deal with the formidable  problems 
of  experimental design that come to  the 
fore in constructing  a multinational  experi- 
ment, particularly  if one of the goals of the 
experiment is to investigate possible cultural 
differences.  These problems  include how to 
control for potential experimental  artifacts 
arising  from  the different  languages  in which 
instructions  are given, the different  curren- 
cies  in which subjects are paid, and the 
different  experimenters  who conduct  the tri- 
als in each country.  To the extent that these 
factors  can be controlled,  different  behavior 
in the different  subject  pools can cautiously 
be used as the basis for preliminary  conjec- 
tures about cultural differences  that might 
account  for the different  observed  behavior. 
The  two-player bargaining environment 
we look at is an ultimatum  game: one bar- 
gainer  makes a proposal  of how to divide a 
certain sum of  money with another bar- 
gainer,  who has the opportunity  to accept  or 
reject the proposed division. If the second 
bargainer  accepts, each bargainer  earns the 
amount proposed for him by the first bar- 
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gainer, and if the second bargainer  rejects, 
then each bargainer  earns  zero. To allow us 
to observe the effects of  experience, sub- 
jects in the bargaining  part of the experi- 
ment each participate  in ten bargaining  ses- 
sions against  different  opponents.  Although 
different  pairs of bargainers  interact simul- 
taneously, each bargainer learns only the 
result of his own negotiation. 
The multiplayer  market environment  we 
examine has a  similar structure:  multiple 
buyers  (nine, in most sessions) each submit 
an offer to a single seller to buy an indivisi- 
ble object worth the same amount to each 
buyer  (and nothing  to the seller). The seller 
has the opportunity  to accept or reject the 
highest price offered. If the seller accepts, 
then the seller earns the highest price of- 
fered, the buyer  who made the highest  offer 
(or, in  case of  ties,  a  buyer selected by 
lottery from among those who made the 
highest offer) receives the  difference be- 
tween the object's value and the price he 
offered,  and all other buyers  receive  zero. If 
the seller rejects, then all players receive 
zero. Each player  learns  whether a transac- 
tion took place and at what price. To allow 
us to observe  the effects of experience,  sub- 
jects in the market part of the experiment 
each  participate in  ten  markets, with  a 
changing  population  of buyers. 
In both the market and bargaining  en- 
vironment, the  prediction of  the  unique 
subgame-perfect equilibrium (under  the 
auxiliary  assumption  that subjects seek to 
maximize their monetary payoffs) is  that 
one player will receive all the wealth (or 
almost all, if payoffs are discrete). To see 
why this is so, suppose for specificity  that 
the total value of a transaction  is $10 and 
that offers can be made in units no smaller 
than $0.05. In  the  bargaining game, the 
assumption  of subgame perfectness means 
that the second bargainer  will accept any 
positive  offer, rather  than reject it and earn 
zero. Therefore,  at equilibrium,  no first  bar- 
gainer  will offer  the second  more than $0.05, 
since even that amount will surely be ac- 
cepted. Thus, there are two subgame-per- 
fect  equilibria:  in  one  of  them, the  first 
bargainer  offers the' second $0.05, keeping 
$9.95 for himself, and the second bargainer 
accepts  (but would have rejected  a proposal 
in which the first bargainer  kept everything 
for himself).  In the second equilibrium,  the 
first bargainer offers zero to  the  second, 
keeping everything  for himself,  and the sec- 
ond bargainer  (nevertheless)  accepts.  These 
two equilibria  become one as the smallest 
unit of transaction  goes to zero, and even 
with the $0.05 unit, both equilibria  give vir- 
tually all the gains from trade to the first 
bargainer. 
The computation  of pure-strategy  perfect 
equilibria is  almost equally simple in the 
case of the market game. Here again, the 
assumption  of subgame perfectness means 
that the seller never rejects the maximum 
bid when it is positive. Because any buyer 
who does not submit  the maximum  bid earns 
zero with certainty, there cannot be  any 
equilibria  at which the high bidder makes a 
positive  profit  (by bidding  $9.95 or less) and 
some other  bidder  submits  a lower  bid, since 
a low bidder could do better by raising  his 
bid to the high bid, which would then give 
him a positive expected payoff. If the high 
bid is no greater  than $9.95,  all bids must  be 
equal. However, if all bids are equal, they 
cannot  be less than $9.95,  since if they  were, 
then a bidder who raised his bid by $0.05 
would increase  his expected payoff  because 
he would  win with certainty  instead of with 
probability '. Thus, the only perfect equilib- 
rium  at which  the maximum  bid is not $10.00 
has all bids equal to $9.95, so that the seller 
earns virtually  all of the profit. There are 
also equilibria  at which the maximum  bid is 
$10.00. In fact, any  distribution  of bids in 
which two or more buyers  bid $10.00 is an 
equilibrium,  since in this case no buyer  can 
earn a positive  payoff  (even) by changing  his 
bid. Thus, there are many equilibria,  but 
only  two  equilibrium prices, $10.00 and 
$9.95, so the seller gets (virtually)  all the 
wealth. The situation is the same when we 
consider perfect equilibria  in mixed strate- 
gies.' 
1Consider an equilibrium  in which  at least  one buyer 
has a positive  expected  payoff  (i.e., in which there is a 
positive  probability  that the high bid will be less than 
$10.00).  Then, at equilibrium  every  buyer  must have a 
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Various  experimenters  (see Werner  Guth 
and Reinhard  Tietz [1990]  and Roth [1992] 
for surveys)  have previously  noted that ob- 
served payoffs  in ultimatum  bargaining  are 
much less  extreme, with the  second bar- 
gainer reliably receiving significantly  more 
than zero when agreement is reached. In 
contrast,  preliminary  evidence from the pi- 
lot markets used to assess the viability of 
the  present experiment, which were  in- 
cluded in an experiment  reported in Pras- 
nikar and Roth (1991),2  suggested  that, af- 
ter subjects  had acquired  a little experience 
with the market,  prices  would conform  very 
closely to the perfect-equilibrium  prediction 
that the single seller in each market  would 
receive all the gains  from trade.  Thus, there 
was reason to  believe that, despite their 
similar  equilibria,  these two economic envi- 
ronments  would yield very different  behav- 
ior. 
The  principal patterns of  behavior ob- 
served in the data from the four countries 
in which this experiment was run are as 
follows. 
1) Regarding the observed market behav- 
ior: (a) In every country, the observed 
market  outcomes  converge  quickly  to the 
perfect equilibrium,  and do not deviate 
from  equilibrium once  it  has  been 
achieved.  (In no country  was the highest 
offered price ever rejected  in any round, 
and so the observed outcomes were al- 
ways Pareto-efficient.)  (b) Hence, there 
are  no  payoff-relevant  differences ob- 
served  in market  behavior  between  coun- 
tries. 
2) Regarding the observed bargaining  be- 
havior:  (a) In every  country,  the observed 
bargaining outcomes  are  significantly 
different from  the  perfect-equilibrium 
predictions. (Further, in every country, 
there was a substantial  frequency  of re- 
jected offers, resulting in Pareto-ineffi- 
cient outcomes.) (b) However there are 
substantial  differences  observed  between 
countries,  such as a pronounced  shift in 
the distribution  of  offers that the first 
bargainer makes to  the  second. (The 
highest offers are made in the United 
States and Yugoslavia, and the lowest 
offers are made in  Israel, with Japan 
in  the middle.  Except  for  the United States 
and Yugoslavia,  all between-country  dif- 
ferences  are  statistically  significant, 
and  between-country differences  are 
bigger than  within-country  differences 
among different experimental  sessions.) 
(c) Within every country,  the probability 
that an offer will be rejected is inversely 
related to the size of the offer (i.e., low 
offers are rejected  more frequently  than 
high offers). However, this pattern does 
not hold between countries:  higher dis- 
agreement rates  are  not  observed in 
countries where  lower offers are  ob- 
served. Further, the probability  that a 
given offer is rejected is lower in coun- 
tries where lower offers are observed. 
(This  will allow  us to distinguish  between 
certainty  will have a positive expected payoff in this 
case). Let x be the smallest  bid that some  buyer  makes 
with positive probability.  At equilibrium  the bid of x 
must  have a positive  expected  payoff,  so the event that 
all buyers  bid x must have positive  probability  (since 
only in this event can a buyer who bids x  be the 
winning  bidder). Suppose a buyer changes his mixed 
strategy  by reducing  to zero the probability  that he bids 
x  and increasing  the probability  that he bids x +0.5. 
Then, in the event that all other buyers  bid x, he will 
win with certainty  instead  of with probability  ', so this 
increases his expected payoff, provided  his expected 
payoff  is positive  when he wins with a bid of x + 0.05 
(i.e., provided  x  is less than $9.95).  Therefore,  in the 
only equilibrium  in which buyers have positive ex- 
pected payoff,  all buyers  bid $9.95  with certainty  (and 
have expected  payoff  $0.05/9). As already  noted, any 
strategies  are in equilibrium  so long as two or more 
bidders bid $10.00 with certainty,  so even in mixed 
strategies  there are only two equilibrium  prices. 
Note that, in addition to having extreme perfect- 
equilibrium  distributions,  both games have a contin- 
uum of other (imperfect)  Nash equilibria.  Any offer x 
in the bargaining  game can occur at an (imperfect) 
equilibrium  if  the  second bargainer's  strategy is  to 
reject all offers but x,  and the same is true in the 
market  game. 
Finally,  recall that the auxiliary  assumption  under 
which all these calculations  are made, namely, that 
subjects  are seeking simply  to maximize  income, has 
been shown  to be questionable  in environments  such  as 
this (see Jack  Ochs and Roth, 1989).  We will return  to 
this point when we discuss the results of this experi- 
ment. 
2See also J. Keith Murnighan  and Roth (1980) for 
an earlier study of  this kind of  market, conducted 
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alternative hypotheses about the role that 
perceptions  of  fairness may play in this 
behavior and how it may vary across cul- 
tures.) 
3)  Regarding  other  comparisons:  (a)  Dif- 
ferences  between  countries  evolved  dif- 
ferently  in  the  market  and  bargaining 
environments: as subjects gained experi- 
ence,  the between-country differences in 
market  outcomes  became  smaller  (and 
ultimately  vanished),  while  the  differ- 
ences  among  bargaining  outcomes  in 
different  countries  grew  larger  as  sub- 
jects  gained  experience.  (b)  Because  of 
the way our experiment is designed,  the 
pattern of bargaining results and the fact 
that the observed market behavior is es- 
sentially  the  same  in  all  countries  sup- 
ports the hypothesis that the differences 
observed in bargaining behavior are not 
due  to  differences  in languages, curren- 
cies,  or  experimenters  but  result  from 
other causes. 
Most  of  the  conclusions  we  draw about 
the susceptibility of these two economic en- 
vironments  to  subject-pool  differences  and 
the  nature of  those  differences, do not de- 
pend on interpreting the causes of observed 
differences between  countries as being cul- 
tural  in  origin.  However,  many  aspects  of 
the  design  of  this  experiment  were  con- 
cerned  with  controlling  for  the  effects  of 
extraneous variables in an experiment con- 
ducted  in  different  countries.  These  and 
other aspects of the design are described in 
detail next. 
I.  Experimental Design 
A.  Controlling  for Between-Country 
Variables 
We  first  discuss  several  features  of  the 
experimental  design  which  specifically  ad- 
dress  problems  arising  from  the  multina- 
tional character of this experiment, namely, 
the problems of controlling for the effects of 
different experimenters, different languages, 
and different currencies. (So  far as we  are 
aware,  the  design  issues  concerning  lan- 
guages  and  currencies  have  not  previously 
been considered  in the manner  we propose 
here.) After discussing these elements of 
the design, we will return  to those features 
of the design that are particular  to the bar- 
gaining and market environments  that are 
the focus of this experiment. 
Our discussion of  those aspects of  the 
experimental  design  motivated  by the multi- 
national  character  of the experiment  will be 
organized as  a  statement of  a  particular 
problem, followed by the  element of  the 
design that addresses  this problem. 
Problem  1:  Experimenter Effects.-Since 
the  experiment involves several  experi- 
menters in  different locations, between- 
country  differences  might arise because of 
uncontrolled  procedural  differences  or be- 
cause of uncontrolled  personal differences 
among  the experimenters. 
Design  Solution.-After  the  procedures 
were initially  designed, each of the experi- 
menters  came to Pittsburgh,  where they ran 
(at least) a bargaining  session and a market 
session. The Pittsburgh  data were therefore 
gathered  by all of the experimenters  before 
they returned to  their home countries to 
gather  the data there.3  In this way,  we were 
able to coordinate  the detailed operational 
procedures among  the  different experi- 
menters. Also, the Pittsburgh  data can be 
used to detect any pure experimenter  effect 
in  the  between-country  comparisons  (i.e., 
any effect due to personal  characteristics  of 
the  experimenters),  since if  these  effects 
exist they will show up  not  only in  the 
comparisons  between countries,  but in com- 
parisons of  the  Pittsburgh sessions con- 
ducted  by the different  experimenters. 
Problem  2:  Language  Effects.-Because 
the instructions  for the experiment  are pre- 
sented in English, Hebrew, Japanese, and 
Slovenian, systematic differences between 
countries might be  observed because of 
3The  Yugoslav  data  were  gathered  by  Prasnikar, 
who ran the first Pittsburgh sessions with Roth observ- 
ing. The  remaining Pittsburgh data were  gathered by 
Zamir (the  Israeli experimenter) and Okuno-Fujiwara 
(the  Japanese  experimenter) with Roth  and Prasnikar 
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the way the instructions  are translated.  (For 
example, the  English words "bargaining," 
"Cnegotiating,"  and "haggling"  are all ap- 
proximate  synonyms  but have different  con- 
notations which might elicit differences in 
behavior.)4 
Design  Solutions.  -We  addressed  the 
problem of language effects both through 
the way in which  the translations  were made 
and, more formally, through the way the 
instructions  for the bargaining  and market 
environments  were  related. (The  instruc- 
tions in all four languages  are available  from 
the first author  upon request.) 
1) Translations:  The experimenter  respon- 
sible for each translation  is a national  of 
the country  in question  who is both lin- 
guistically  and culturally  fluent in Amer- 
ican  English (all  three  non-American 
experimenters  had lived  for extended  pe- 
riods in the United States). Efforts  were 
made to phrase the English instructions 
in terms that could be faithfully trans- 
lated into each of the languages.  Aside 
from avoiding  terms with heavy or am- 
biguous  connotations  either in English  or 
in translation,  this also led to phrasing  in 
less abstract  terms than are sometimes 
used in single-culture  experiments.  (For 
example, subjects in bargaining  experi- 
ments are sometimes  instructed  that they 
will be in the position of "player 1" or 
"player  2," but this turns out to be dif- 
ficult to translate  into Slovenian  without 
sounding  frivolous.) 
2) Control for translation  differences:  The 
instructions  for the bargaining  and mar- 
ket environments  were written in par- 
allel, using the  same vocabulary.  (For 
example, in  both  environments, those 
subjects who made proposals were re- 
ferred to as "buyers,"  while those who 
made  acceptances or  rejections were 
termed "sellers.")  If a translation  differ- 
ence is responsible  for an observed be- 
havior difference between countries, it 
should show up in both the market and 
bargaining  data. In particular,  the pat- 
tern of results that would allow us to be 
most confident that a  between-country 
difference  in bargaining  behavior,  for ex- 
ample,  was not due to translation  differ- 
ences would be  if  there were no  be- 
tween-country  difference  observed  in the 
market behavior and if the market and 
bargaining  behavior were also different 
from each other in each country.  That is, 
suppose we observe a pattern of results 
of the following sort, in which the data 
differ between two countries for one of 
the environments  (in this case, the bar- 
gaining  environment),  but not the other: 
market/country  1 0 bargaining/country  1 
market/country  2 0 bargaining/country  2 
If the market data (like the bargaining 
data) also showed differences between 
the two countries, or if the market and 
bargaining  data were the same in one of 
the countries,  then we could not be sure 
that the  between-country  difference in 
the bargaining  data was not due to some 
property  of the translation.  However, if 
the pattern of results is as above, then 
we can at least put an upper bound on 
the  effect of  the  translation:  it  is  not 
large enough to  cause the  markets to 
yield  different results in  the  different 
countries or to cause the bargaining  to 
yield the same results as the market in 
one  of  the countries. This would thus 
support the hypothesis  that the transla- 
tion is  not  the  cause of  the  observed 
difference  in the bargaining.' 
4This problem could not  have been  avoided by 
presenting the  identical instructions  in  English to 
English-speaking  subjects in  each of  the  countries. 
Aside from the selection effects of choosing  only En- 
glish-speakers,  there is no way to control  the different 
connotations  that various English terms and phrases 
might have to nonnative  English-speakers  in different 
countries. 
5A  priori,  either  environment  might  have  served  as a 
control for the other, but the strong convergence  to 
equilibrium  observed  in the preliminary  trials of the 
market  in the United States made us anticipate  that 
greater  between-country  differences  would  be observed 
in the bargaining.  Another  common  approach  for con- 
trolling  for translation  differences  in survey  research  is 
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Problem 3: Currency  Effects.-Because  the 
subjects  were paid in dinars,  dollars,  shekels, 
and  yen,  systematic differences between 
countries  might be observed  because of the 
different incentives that the potential pay- 
ments give to  subjects or because of  the 
different numerical scale  on  which pay- 
ments are made. (That  is, subjects  in experi- 
ments often tend to choose round numbers 
[see e.g., Wulf Albers and Gisela Albers, 
1983], and these may depend on the units 
involved, so that subjects  proposing prices 
in dollars might choose different numbers 
than those dealing in thousands  of yen, or 
hundreds  of thousands  of dinars.)6 
Design  Solutions.-(a)  To assess the ex- 
tent to which between-country  differences 
might be due to differences in purchasing 
power,  the Pittsburgh  data establish  a base- 
line by including  sessions in which the po- 
tential payoff ranged from $10 to $30. In 
each country, the size of  the payoffs was 
then chosen to give a purchasing  power on 
the high side of $10. If observed  differences 
between countries  fall outside the range of 
differences  due to payoffs  observed  in Pitts- 
burgh, they are likely to be due to other 
factors. (b) To  control for  differences in 
units, proposed  prices in all countries  were 
made in terms of 1,000 tokens, with incre- 
ments being made in units of five tokens. 
We hasten to note that there remain  un- 
controlled  differences  between subject  pools 
that might not be regarded as "cultural." 
For example, in  Israel and Yugoslavia, a 
much higher percentage of our sample of 
subjects are  army veterans than  in  the 
United States or Japan.  Therefore,  any con- 
clusions about the causes of between-coun- 
try differences  have to be circumspect. 
B.  Other  Aspects of the Experimental 
Design and Procedures 
In order that experimental  sessions could 
be easily arranged  in multiple locations, a 
"one-classroom" set  of  procedures was 
adopted for each of the two experimental 
environments. Parallel  procedures were 
used in both environments,  so that any ob- 
served differences between  environments 
would be attributable  to differences  in the 
economic  environment,  such as the number 
of  buyers or the information  available to 
buyers  and sellers. 
Subjects  who participated  in a bargaining 
session were randomly  divided into buyers 
and sellers and then separated into two 
rows on opposite sides of the room. After 
the instructions  were read aloud, subjects 
played a practice round (to verify that ev- 
eryone understood how to  make and re- 
spond to proposals) and then ten rounds, 
changing  partners  after each round. Buyers 
made a price proposal  by filling  out a mes- 
sage form, on which they were identified 
only  by a coded  identification  number.  These 
message forms were then sorted and dis- 
tributed to  the  sellers.  The  sellers' re- 
sponses were returned  to the buyers  in the 
same way, so that in any round no buyer 
knew  with which seller he was matched  and 
vice versa, and each bargainer  learned only 
the result of  his own negotiation. At  the 
conclusion of  the session, one round was 
chosen at random, and subjects  were paid 
their earnings  for that round.7 
Subjects who participated in  a  market 
session were also divided into buyers and 
sellers but were not separated  by category, 
since there were only two sellers. In each 
round, the buyers were divided into two 
markets,  A and B. The market in which a 
buyer  was participating  in a given  round  was 
lates the instructions  back into the original  language, 
so that the two versions  can be compared  for substan- 
tive differences.  For our purposes  in the present  exper- 
iment,  we felt that this  would  not be adequate,  because 
the issue was to control  for subtle  connotations.  For a 
recent market  experiment  that uses back translation, 
see Steven  Kachelmeier  and Mohamed  Shehata  (1990). 
6Since  the Yugoslav  data  were collected,  a devalua- 
tion has reduced  currency  units by a factor  of 10,000. 
7In  all countries except Yugoslavia, where university 
authorities deemed it inappropriate, subjects were also 
paid a fixed amount for showing up on time ($5 in the 
United  States,  10 IS in Israel, and 1,000 yen in Japan, 
with an additional 500 yen in travel expenses  for Uni- 
versity of Tokyo students who traveled to Keio Univer- 
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indicated on  his  message form for  that 
round, but no subject knew which (other) 
buyers  were in each market  in each round. 
(The motivations  for this arrangement  were 
to prevent  the ten rounds  from becoming  a 
repeated game among a constant group of 
buyers and to parallel the bargaining  ses- 
sions, in which bargaining  partners  changed 
each round.)  After buyers'  proposed prices 
for a given round  were collected, the high- 
est  proposed price  in  each  market was 
posted on the blackboard,  together  with the 
identification  number  of the buyer  who had 
proposed it (or who had been selected at 
random from among the high proposers). 
The seller in each market  then accepted or 
rejected this offer. This decision was also 
posted on the blackboard,  and the round 
ended. 
In order that no subject  in a market  ses- 
sion should know which of the others were 
sellers and  which  were buyers,  subjects  were 
instructed  to fill out forms at each opportu- 
nity (so that there would be  no point at 
which only sellers or only buyers  were writ- 
ing). When buyers  were recording  their pro- 
posed prices, sellers were asked to estimate 
what the high price would be in their mar- 
ket, and while sellers were recording  their 
acceptance  or rejection,  buyers  were asked 
to estimate the likelihood that the posted 
high price would be accepted.  In order that 
the procedures in the bargaining  sessions 
would parallel  those in the market  sessions, 
buyers  and sellers in the bargaining  sessions 
also filled out these additional  forms.  How- 
ever, only the offers and acceptances/rejec- 
tions influenced  each subject's  payoff from 
the experiment,  and therefore  these are the 
primary  data which will be the focus of the 
analysis. 
In each country,  a pilot session was con- 
ducted with  experienced bargainers, re- 
cruited  from subjects  who had completed a 
bargaining  session.  All other bargaining  and 
market sessions used subjects  who had not 
previously  participated  in any other part of 
this or related experiments.  Each session 
lasted ten rounds,  which was announced  at 
the beginning  of the session and just prior 
to the last (tenth) round. 
The tenth-round  data will therefore  be of 
particular  interest, for two reasons.  First, it 
represents  the round  at which  these subjects 
had acquired  the most experience  with the 
game and with the reactions of the other 
subjects. Second, because the tenth round 
was the last, the experimental  environment 
gave subjects no  incentives extending be- 
yond the  play of  that round. (In  earlier 
rounds, even though subjects are not en- 
gaged in a repeated game with the same 
players, they may have some incentive to 
make proposals  that will help them gather 
information  about the likely reactions that 
different prices will elicit, in order to use 
this  information in  subsequent rounds.) 
However,  the data from earlier rounds  will 
also be of interest, in order to permit  us to 
investigate  the different  dynamics  by which 
behavior  evolves  in the market  and bargain- 
ing environments  in the various  subject  pools 
examined. 
C.  Session Parameters 
The basic data in each of the four coun- 
tries come from three bargaining  sessions 
and two market sessions. In  the  United 
States, the value of the object being negoti- 
ated or bid for in the bargaining  and market 
sessions was  $10,  in  Yugoslavia it  was 
400,000 dinars, in Japan 2,000 yen, and in 
Israel 20 shekels.8  In the United States, an 
additional  session of each of the market  and 
bargaining environments was  conducted 
with a $30 value, to establish  a baseline on 
the effect of changing the amount of the 
monetary  payoffs. 
Recall  that  all  proposed prices were 
translated into units of  1,000 tokens, with 
8The Yugoslav data were collected  from 14 through 
28  December  1989, a period  during which  there was 
substantial inflation, and the  figure of  400,000 dinars 
was  reached  on  the  basis of  a comparison of  student 
wages and a price-index calculation at the beginning of 
that period.  In Israel and Japan, the  figures were  set 
on  the  basis  of  comparisons  of  student  wages  and 
published  figures of  purchasing-power parity. In  each 
case, the aim was to choose  a figure that would yield a 
purchasing power slightly on the high side of $10 in the 
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the  requirement that prices be  stated in 
increments  of 5. Thus, in both the market 
and bargaining  environments,  there are two 
perfect-equilibrium  prices, differing  by 5 to- 
kens. These prices are 995 and 1,000 in the 
market,  and 0 and 5 in the bargaining.9  The 
difference  of 5 tokens  between  the two equi- 
librium  prices is negligible in terms of the 
payoff  to any subject  in any  of the countries. 
Subjects  were recruited  from the student 
populations  of the University  of Pittsburgh, 
the  University of  Ljubljana,  the  Hebrew 
University, and Keio  University and the 
University  of Tokyo. In Pittsburgh,  subjects 
were drawn  from undergraduate  economics 
classes  and  M.B.A.  business classes; in 
Israel,  they  were drawn  from  undergraduate 
first-  and second-year  economics  classes  (ex- 
cept for the 16 May 1990  bargaining  session, 
which had a mixture  of economics,  business 
and psychology  students);  in Ljubljana,  they 
were drawn from economics students (the 
14 December 1989 bargaining  session con- 
sisted  entirely of  first-year students, the 
other sessions consisted of second-, third-, 
and fourth-year  students mixed together); 
and in Tokyo, they were drawn  from third- 
and fourth-year  economics students at the 
two universities  (mixed  together  in each ses- 
sion). 
In each session, we tried to have 20 sub- 
jects, so that there would be nine buyers  in 
each of the two markets  operating  in each 
round  of each market  session and so that in 
the bargaining  sessions each buyer would 
interact exactly once with each seller. On 
those occasions  when fewer than 20 subjects 
reported for a session (in one market ses- 
sion  and  two bargaining sessions in  the 
United States and in one bargaining  session 
in Japan),  the session proceeded  with fewer 
subjects.  In the market session, this meant 
that there were fewer buyers in each mar- 
ket, but in the bargaining  session it meant 
that some buyers  and sellers would interact 
twice in the course  of the ten-round  session. 
To prevent such a session from taking on 
some of  the  character of  repeated play, 
buyers and sellers were therefore each as- 
signed two coded identification  numbers,  so 
that they could not know when they were 
matched  with someone for a second time. 
II. Results 
A.  Market Behavior 
Perhaps  the single most striking  result of 
this experiment  was the remarkably  consis- 
tent convergence  to equilibrium  observed  in 
the markets.  Recall that two markets,  A and 
B, operated simultaneously  in each of the 
ten rounds  of each session. In no nonprac- 
tice  round'0 was the  maximum  proposed 
price ever rejected,  and in every  session the 
transaction  price in both markets rose to 
the equilibrium  price of either 995 or 1,000. 
In one session (Israel, 4 April 1990), this 
double convergence  was achieved as early 
as round 3, and in no session did it occur 
later than round 7. Furthermore,  in no ses- 
sion did the transaction  price in either mar- 
ket fall below 995 in any  subsequent  round. 
Since the transaction  price in each mar- 
ket is the maximum  price offered, the con- 
vergence to  equilibrium  could conceivably 
be the consequence of one aggressive  bid- 
der in each market.  However,  this is not the 
case: the markets  exhibit a high concentra- 
tion of bids at or near the equilibrium  bids. 
For example,  there is no market session in 
which fewer than a third of the buyers  pro- 
posed prices of 995 or 1,000 in round 10 
(and in most sessions the percentage  is far 
higher). In every country,  over half of the 
9The  decision  to  use  a  market with  many buyers 
(i.e.,  proposers)  and  a  single  seller,  rather  than  one 
with  one  buyer  and  many sellers  (which would  have 
had equilibrium prices of 0 and 5), was made so as to 
gather more data on price proposals from each market 
and  in  the  anticipation  that  competition  might  act 
more  forcefully  on  the  active  (proposer)  side  of  the 
market. Prasnikar and Roth (1991) compared bargain- 
ing and market games of the kind studied in this paper 
with an additional two-person game in which the per- 
fect  equilibrium  gave  almost  all  the  wealth  to  the 
proposer and in which equilibrium was observed exper- 
imentally. The  relationships  among all three  kinds of 
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TABLE  1-THE  FIRST  Two  HIGHEST  PRICES  p  OFFERED  IN EACH  OF THE  MARKETS  AND  THE 
BASIC  DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS 
A. Pittsburgh: 
29 June 1989,  22 February 1990,  14 March 1990, 
Prasnikar (N=  9)  Zamir (N = 7)  Okuno-Fujiwara, $30 (N = 9) 
Second-  Second-  Second- 
Highest  highest  Mean  Highest  highest  Mean  Highest  highest  Mean 
Period  Market  price p  price p  (SD)  price p  price p  (SD)  price p  price p  (SD) 
1  A  800  775  575  800  700  586  900  885  772 
(1)  (1)  (198)  (1)  (2)  (165)  (1)  (1)  (152) 
B  900  800  581  805  800  629  850  805  664 
(3)  (1)  (338)  (1)  (1)  (153)  (1)  (1)  (151) 
2  A  935  900  665  900  825  758  965  950  721 
(1)  (2)  (299)  (1)  (1)  (119)  (1)  (1)  (205) 
B  900  855  676  1,000  900  635  930  880  684 
(1)  (1)  (269)  (1)  (1)  (262)  (1)  (1)  (252) 
3  A  950  900  711  950  900  678  985  970  708 
(1)  (2)  (237)  (1)  (1)  (258)  (1)  (1)  (273) 
B  985  925  827  1,000  950  778  970  950  753 
(1)  (1)  (148)  (1)  (1)  (213)  (1)  (1)  (171) 
4  A  995  990  864  955  935  613  960  930  748 
(1)  (1)  (177)  (1)  (1)  (326)  (1)  (1)  (218) 
B  990  940  674  995  925  737  985  980  782 
(1)  (1)  (335)  (1)  (1)  (272)  (1)  (2)  (307) 
S  A  995  990  909  975  900  721  975  965  824 
(1)  (2)  (075)  (1)  (1)  (176)  (1)  (3)  (203) 
B  1,000  990  641  1,000  995  925  995  990  799 
(2)  (1)  (403)  (1)  (1)  (146)  (1)  (1)  (193) 
6  A  1,000  950  581  995  990  822  990  970  879 
(1)  (1)  (376)  (1)  (1)  (216)  (2)  (1)  (161) 
B  995  980  868  925  750  539  995  970  782 
(4)  (1)  (325)  (1)  (1)  (298)  (1)  (1)  (199) 
7  A  995  955  744  995  980  631  1,000  995  858 
(1)  (1)  (327)  (1)  (1)  (382)  (1)  (2)  (151) 
B  995  990  834  995  955  700  1,000  995  848 
(4)  (1)  (325)  (1)  (1)  (298)  (1)  (2)  (189) 
8  A  995  990  758  995  990  796  995  960  811 
(3)  (1)  (377)  (1)  (1)  (221)  (2)  (1)  (191) 
B  1,000  995  809  995  990  669  995  975  789 
(1)  (3)  (330)  (1)  (1)  (319)  (1)  (1)  (176) 
9  A  1,000  995  853  995  990  501  995  990  804 
(1)  (4)  (324)  (1)  (1)  (373)  (1)  (1)  (196) 
B  995  990  531  995  990  775  995  985  906 
(1)  (1)  (426)  (3)  (1)  (367)  (4)  (1)  (163) 
10  A  1,000  995  621  995  990  534  1,000  995  807 
(1)  (3)  (457)  (2)  (1)  (458)  (1)  (1)  (216) 
B  1,000  995  741  1,000  995  699  1,000  995  916 
(1)  (2)  (342)  (1)  (2)  (390)  (2)  (3)  (170) 
buyers proposed a price of 995 or 1,000 at 
least once (18 out of 32 buyers in the $10 
sessions in the United States; 31 out of 36 
buyers  in Yugoslavia;  29 out of 36 buyers  in 
Japan;  and 19 out of 36 buyers  in Israel). 
The market  data are summarized  in Table 
1. For example, looking at Table 1A one 
sees that in the market  conducted  in Pitts- 
burgh on 29 June 1989, with a transaction 
value of $10, there were nine buyers  in each 
market (so there were 20 subjects, two of 
whom  were sellers).  In round  1, the high  bid 
in market  A was 800, and only one bidder  in 
that market proposed that price, while the 
second-highest  price  was 775, also proposed 
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TABLE  1-(CONTINUED) 
B. Ljubljana: 
14 December  1989,  28 December  1989, 
Prasnikar (N  = 9)  Prasnikar (N  =  9) 
Second-  Second- 
Highest  highest  Mean  Highest  highest  Mean 
Period  Market  price p  price p  (SD)  price p  price p  (SD) 
1  A  875  840  730  920  890  795 
(2)  (1)  (113)  (1)  (2)  (97) 
B  825  820  664  870  835  736 
(1)  (1)  (158)  (1)  (1)  (89) 
2  A  885  875  767  950  940  835 
(1)  (1)  (90)  (1)  (1)  (105) 
B  950  880  845  960  955  835 
(1)  (1)  (52)  (1)  (1)  (147) 
3  A  965  930  893  985  980  836 
(1)  (1)  (62)  (1)  (2)  (186) 
B  975  955  787  990  975  894 
(1)  (1)  (211)  (1)  (1)  (152) 
4  A  1,000  975  803  1,000  995  858 
(1)  (1)  (307)  (2)  (2)  (201) 
B  985  980  836  995  990  903 
(1)  (1)  (153)  (1)  (2)  (141) 
5  A  995  975  858  1,000  995  959 
(1)  (1)  (154)  (1)  (3)  (67) 
B  1,000  995  833  1,000  995  874 
(1)  (1)  (316)  (3)  (2)  (196) 
6  A  995  990  839  1,000  995  856 
(3)  (1)  (319)  (1)  (2)  (192) 
B  995  985  783  1,000  995  974 
(1)  (1)  (330)  (2)  (5)  (65) 
7  A  995  990  846  1,000  995  947 
(2)  (3)  (327)  (2)  (4)  (131) 
B  995  990  928  995  990  943 
(1)  (5)  (162)  (4)  (2)  (96) 
8  A  995  990  933  1,000  995  989 
(2)  (3)  (163)  (1)  (4)  (10) 
B  995  990  852  1,000  995  995 
(3)  (2)  (329)  (2)  (5)  (4) 
9  A  995  990  791  1,000  995  994 
(1)  (4)  (340)  (1)  (5)  (3) 
B  995  990  988  995  990  991 
(3)  (4)  (8)  (6)  (2)  (7) 
10  A  995  975  827  995  975  993 
(6)  (1)  (350)  (8)  (1)  (7) 
B  1,000  995  941  1,000  995  993 
(1)  (7)  (165)  (1)  (5)  (6) 
highest  price proposed  in market  B was 900, 
and this price was proposed by three dif- 
ferent buyers.  (Notice that, when proposing 
their prices, the  buyers have no  way of 
knowing  which other buyers  are in the mar- 
ket with them: a different  sorting  of buyers 
could easily have made 900 the transaction 
price in both markets,  or 775 the transac- 
tion price in market  A.) By round 5, how- 
ever, both markets  have a transaction  price 
of 995 or 1,000, and the transaction  price 
never drops below 995 in either market in 
any subsequent round. By round 10, the 
modal proposed price is 995, with 7 out of 
18 buyers  proposing  prices  of 995 or 1,000. 
Notice that the  pattern is very similar 
both in  the  other $10 Pittsburgh  market 
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TABLE  1  (CONTINUED) 
C. Tokyo: 
17 May 1990,  18 May 1990, 
Okuno-Fujiwara (N  9)  Okuno-Fujiwara (N  9) 
Second-  Second- 
Highest  highest  Mean  Highest  highest  Mean 
Period  Market  price p  price p  (SD)  price p  price p  (SD) 
1  A  900  850  764  875  855  778 
(1)  (2)  (132)  (1)  (1)  (77) 
B  990  950  735  910  850  784 
(1)  (1)  (180)  (1)  (1)  (71) 
2  A  955  925  750  925  920  783 
(1)  (1)  (295)  (1)  (1)  (267) 
B  995  990  803  950  930  812 
(1)  (2)  (234)  (1)  (1)  (133) 
3  A  980  975  849  965  950  802 
(1)  (1)  (134)  (1)  (2)  (286) 
B  965  950  694  950  910  812 
(1)  (2)  (392)  (1)  (1)  (175) 
4  A  975  955  933  975  970  895 
(2)  (1)  (44)  (1)  (1)  (122) 
B  995  985  968  975  960  886 
(1)  (2)  (19)  (1)  (2)  (135) 
5  A  995  985  970  1,000  990  976 
(1)  (2)  (17)  (1)  (1)  (15) 
B  995  985  928  980  975  919 
(1)  (1)  (79)  (2)  (2)  (121) 
6  A  995  985  963  990  975  901 
(2)  (2)  (45)  (3)  (1)  (127) 
B  995  990  961  995  990  968 
(2)  (2)  (69)  (3)  (2)  (47) 
7  A  995  990  858  1,000  995  898 
(1)  (2)  (215)  (1)  (2)  (191) 
B  995  990  976  995  990  982 
(3)  (2)  (31)  (2)  (5)  (24) 
8  A  1,000  995  988  995  970  934 
(1)  (4)  (15)  (6)  (1)  (161) 
B  1,000  995  909  1,000  995  984 
(1)  (3)  (175)  (2)  (4)  (32) 
9  A  995  950  906  1,000  995  967 
(6)  (1)  (175)  (1)  (5)  (80) 
B  995  990  967  1,000  995  919 
(6)  (2)  (81)  (1)  (4)  (161) 
10  A  995  990  958  1,000  995  961 
(7)  (1)  (110)  (1)  (4)  (44) 
B  995  950  979  1,000  995  880 
(7)  (1)  (33)  (2)  (3)  (328) 
out of  14 buyers propose 995 or 1,000 in 
round 10, and in the Pittsburgh  market in 
which the value of  a transaction  was $30 
(Table 1A, 14 March 1990), in which 7 out 
of 18 buyers  propose the equilibrium  price. 
Therefore, the change in the scale of the 
payoffs makes no important  difference, as 
might be expected in a market  in which no 
buyer  is making  more than pennies in any  of 
the final  rounds.1" 
"1The pattern  was very similar  in the pilot market 
session reported  and analyzed  in Prasnikar  and Roth 
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TABLE 1-(CONTINUED) 
D. Jerusalem: 
4 April 1990, 1st session,  4 April 1990, 2nd session, 
Zamir (N = 9)  Zamir (N = 9) 
Second-  Second- 
Highest  highest  Mean  Highest  highest  Mean 
Period  Market  price p  price p  (SD)  price p  price p  (SD) 
1  A  900  850  806  900  850  733 
(3)  (2)  (126)  (2)  (1)  (148) 
B  900  850  728  975  960  854 
(1)  (2)  (215)  (1)  (1)  (145) 
2  A  950  930  872  1,000  990  877 
(1)  (1)  (66)  (1)  (1)  (102) 
B  995  950  862  985  975  913 
(1)  (1)  (89)  (1)  (1)  (81) 
3  A  950  900  794  995  990  942 
(2)  (3)  (267)  (1)  (2)  (65) 
B  950  925  783  995  990  899 
(1)  (1)  (178)  (1)  (3)  (159) 
4  A  965  950  846  1,000  995  924 
(1)  (2)  (145)  (1)  (2)  (80) 
B  960  955  875  995  990  891 
(2)  (1)  (131)  (2)  (2)  (195) 
5  A  960  955  931  1,000  995  877 
(2)  (2)  (39)  (1)  (2)  (164) 
B  980  970  874  995  990  986 
(2)  (2)  (189)  (5)  (1)  (16) 
6  A  1,000  990  959  1,000  995  937 
(1)  (2)  (37)  (1)  (4)  (84) 
B  1,000  980  919  995  975  945 
(1)  (1)  (74)  (4)  (1)  (67) 
7  A  995  990  806  1,000  995  920 
(1)  (1)  (317)  (2)  (2)  (161) 
B  995  990  911  995  985  802 
(1)  (1)  (157)  (4)  (1)  (310) 
8  A  995  990  978  1,000  995  843 
(3)  (2)  (20)  (2)  (2)  (305) 
B  995  980  869  1,000  995  926 
(1)  (1)  (185)  (1)  (5)  (197) 
9  A  1,000  995  968  1,000  995  835 
(2)  (1)  (64)  (1)  (5)  (337) 
B  995  990  810  995  985  847 
(1)  (2)  (342)  (3)  (1)  (212) 
10  A  995  990  820  1,000  995  769 
(2)  (2)  (329)  (1)  (2)  (339) 
B  1,000  995  964  1,000  995  903 
(1)  (3)  (41)  (1)  (5)  (149) 
Notes:  The  numbers  in  parentheses  under  the  prices  are  the  numbers  of  buyers  who  offered  that  price.  N 
represents the number of buyers in each market (i.e.,  in each round there are two sellers and 2N  buyers, half in 
market A and half in market B. 
Similarly,  parts  B-D  of Table 1 show  that 
by the tenth round the two Yugoslav  mar- 
kets both have 14 out of 18 buyers  propos- 
ing 995 or 1,000, the two Japanese  markets 
have 14 out of 18 and 10 out of 18 buyers 
proposing  995 or 1,000, and the two Israeli 
markets  have 6 out of 18 and 9 out of 18 
buyers  proposing  995 or 1,000. 
Figure 1 shows the distributions  and cu- 
mulative  distributions  of proposed  prices  for 
rounds  1 and 10 for the two U.S. markets  in 
which the transaction  value was $10 and for 1080  THE  AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
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the one in which it was $30. (The histogram 
bars group  price intervals  of 25. Since price 
proposals  are in increments  of five tokens, 
this means  that an interior  bar on the graph, 
such as 500, contains the proposals from 
490 through  510, while an endpoint,  such as 
1,000, contains the proposals of 990, 995, 
and 1,000.) Figure 2  contains the  distri- 
butions  and  cumulative distributions of 
proposed prices for rounds 1  and 10 in 
Yugoslavia,  Japan, and Israel. The pattern 
of how proposed prices changed over time 
is the same for all countries (and for $10 
and $30 transaction  values in the United 
States). In round 1, no more than 14 per- 
cent of the proposals  are higher  than 910 in 
any country,  and except for a single offer in 
Japan,  there  are  no  proposals in  the 
990-1,000 range. However,  in round 10, at 
least 39 percent of the proposals are from 
990 to 1,000 in every country  (and the con- 
centration  of proposals  in this highest  range 
goes up to over 80 percent).  Thus, the shift 
in proposed prices from the first to tenth 
rounds  in each country  is clear. 
While there are some detectable differ- 
ences between the distributions  in different 
countries,12 we attach little significance  to 
them for two reasons. First, none of these 
differences influences the  payoffs to  any 
agent: in  the final rounds of  the market 
sessions, any buyer  who proposes  a price of 
less than 900, say, has every reason to ex- 
pect (correctly) that his  earnings will be 
zero for that round. For this reason, eco- 
nomic theory makes no  prediction about 
what the distribution  of low offers  will look 
like. Indeed, recall that, at any equilibrium 
in which two or  more buyers propose a 
price of 1,000,  no further  prediction  can be 
made about  the price  proposals  of any  other 
buyers, since these  neither influence any 
payoff  nor move the market  out of equilib- 
rium. 
What Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 make 
clear is that,  while there is some variation  in 
transaction  prices  in round  1, this has disap- 
peared  by round  10, when all transactions  in 
all markets in all countries are at equilib- 
rium prices. 
B.  Bargaining  Behavior 
The contrast  between the bargaining  data 
and the market  data is striking:  in the bar- 
gaining sessions, equilibrium  price propos- 
als (of 0 or 5) make up less than 1 percent 
of the data from any country.  In all coun- 
tries the price proposals  made by bargainers 
are much nearer the middle of the range, 
and in all countries  low offers are rejected 
at a substantially  higher rate than higher 
offers. 
However, despite the gross similarity  of 
the bargaining  data from all countries,  espe- 
cially when compared to the market data, 
there are notable differences  between the 
distributions  of bargaining  proposals  in dif- 
ferent countries.  The most obvious  of these 
is  seen  in  the  different modal proposals 
(aggregated  over all rounds of bargaining). 
In the United States (for bargaining  both 
over $10 and $30) and in Yugoslavia  the 
modal proposal is 500, while in Japan and 
Israel the modal proposal  is 400. 
To  test  formally whether these  differ- 
ences are reliable,  we must disaggregate  the 
data by rounds. The  reason is  that data 
from different  rounds of the same bargain- 
ing session are not independent, since the 
same bargainers  are involved  (even though 
they are not paired in the same way). How- 
ever, the proposals  made in a given round 
by bargainers  in different  experimental  ses- 
sions are independent,  and so we can look 
at all the data for each country,  round by 
round. 
Before describing the  formal tests, we 
first  consider  these distributions  graphically. 
Figure  3 presents  the round-1  and round-10 
distributions and cumulative distributions 
for the $10 and $30 bargaining  sessions in 
the United States, and Figure 4 presents 
the round-1  and round-10  distributions  and 
cumulative  distributions  of  offers  in 
Yugoslavia,  Japan, and Israel. In addition, 
the figures  show the proportion  of offers in 
each interval  that were accepted (the black 
12The  Mann-Whitney U test reveals significant dif- 
ferences in most comparisons of the  distributions, but 
all of the distributions are very highly concentrated in 
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region) and rejected (the  lighter, striped 
region). 
In choosing  the appropriate  statistical  test 
to compare  the distributions  between coun- 
tries, we had to take into account the fol- 
lowing features of these empirical  distribu- 
tions: 
1) The distributions  are highly  asymmetric, 
with few observations  higher than the 
mode. The distributions  are clearly not 
normal  and in fact fail the Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov  test for normality.13 
2) The sample  sizes we are dealing  with are 
relatively  small.  In each session involving 
20 bargainers,  there are 100 offers made 
by the 10 buyers  in 10 rounds.  However, 
because of the dependence between of- 
fers made by the same buyer  in different 
rounds,  we compare  data  round  by round, 
which means that we base our tests on 
samples of size 10 when comparing  two 
sessions and on samples  of size 30 when 
we  compare two countries with three 
sessions in each. 
Guided  by these considerations  we used the 
nonparametric  Mann-Whitney  U test based 
on ranks  (see e.g., Sidney  Siegel, 1956).  The 
idea of the test is as follows.  Assume  we are 
comparing  two samples from variables X 
(offers in population 1) and Y (offers in 
population  2). Line up all the observations 
of both variables,  from smallest to largest. 
The U statistic  is then the number  of times 
an X observation  precedes a Y observation 
(with some adjustment  for ties). If U is very 
small, this should be an indication  that the 
distribution  of X  is "higher"  than the dis- 
tribution of  Y. The  distribution  of  U  is 
known  when X and Y have the same distri- 
bution, and therefore we can test the null 
hypothesis that X  and Y  have the same 
distribution  against  the alternative  hypothe- 
sis that the two distributions  are different. 
The U statistics  also provide  an estimate 
of the magnitude  of the difference  between 
the two groups. A measure for this differ- 
ence is  P(X>  Y); that is, the probability 
that a random  observation  from X  will be 
higher than a random  observation  from Y. 
If  X  and Y  have the  same distribution, 
then clearly P(X  > Y) = P(Y > X),  and the 
higher the distribution  of  X  compared to 
that of  Y, the  higher will be  P(X>Y) 
minus P(Y > X). With the U statistics  and 
a routine counting of  the number of  ties 
in the two samples of offers, we estimated 
P(X  > Y), P(Y > X),  and P(X  = Y). These 
estimates have the  following probabilistic 
interpretation:  assume that we  draw two 
random  offers x and y from the given sam- 
ples of offers in group 1 and 2, respectively; 
our  estimates are  then  the  probabilities 
P(x  > y),  P(y  > x),  and  P(x  =  y),  respec- 
tively. 
Table 2 presents the results of the com- 
parisons  of the round-10  bargaining  propos- 
TABLE  2-MANN-WHITNEY  TEST  BETWEEN 
COUNTRIES:  POOLED  ROUND-10  BARGAINING 
Country 
Country  United States  Yugoslavia  Japan 
Yugoslavia  0.35 
0.45 
(0.51) 
Japan  0.26  0.29 
0.62  0.59 
(0.02)*  (0.04)* 
Israel  0.10  0.11  0.21 
0.79  0.81  0.69 
(0.00)*  (0.00)*  (0.00)* 
Notes: In each cell, the first number is the  probability 
that  an offer  from  the  row country exceeds  an  offer 
from the  column  country. The  second  number is  the 
probability that an offer from the  column country ex- 
ceeds an offer from the row country. The third number 
(in  parentheses)  is  the  significance level  for the  two- 
sided  test  of  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  offers  are 
drawn from identical distributions (i.e.,  the probability 
that a difference as extreme as the observed difference 
would  arise from two identical  distributions). Cells  in 
which this probability is less than 0.05 are marked with 
an asterisk. 
13In  each of the four countries,  the pooled sample 
of all offers  failed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test at the 
0.01 significance  level. The same test by round  in each 
country  rejects  the normal-distribution  hypothesis  in 27 
out of 40 cases (the exceptions are eight rounds in 
Israel  and five in Japan,  and even there the maximum 
significance  level was less than 0.4). 1086  THE  AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
TABLE  3-MANN-WHITNEY  U TEST,  BY SESSION:  NUMBER  OF DIFFERENCES  AT 
SIGNIFICANCE  LEVEL  0.05 FOR  ROUND-10  BARGAINING 
Country 
Country  United States  Yugoslavia  Japan  Israel 
United States  0/6 
Yugoslavia  3/12  2/3 
Japan  5/12  3/9  0/3 
Israel  11/12  6/9  6/9  0/3 
Notes: Each diagonal cell indicates how many significant differences were found when 
the round-10 bargaining data were compared for each pair of sessions in that country. 
Each off-diagonal cell indicates how many significant differences were found when the 
round-10 data from each session in the row country were compared with the round-10 
data from each  session  in the  column country. Since  there  are four sessions  in the 
United  States (one for each experimenter plus a $30 session) and three in each of the 
other countries, there are six pairwise comparisons within the United  States and three 
within each other country, and there are 12 pairwise comparisons between the United 
States and each other country and nine pairwise comparisons between each other pair 
of countries. 
als in  all  countries. The  observed distri- 
butions are significantly  different between 
every pair of countries except the United 
States and Yugoslavia. 
This raises the question  of whether  these 
differences can be  accounted for by cur- 
rency or experimenter  effects. As discussed 
earlier, tests for this possibility  were built 
into the experimental  design by having  the 
three $10 bargaining  sessions in Pittsburgh 
run by the  three different experimenters 
and by having  a fourth,  $30, Pittsburgh  bar- 
gaining  session. If the distributions  of offers 
are responding  to changes  in the value of a 
transaction,  this should show up as a dif- 
ference between the $30 bargaining  session 
and the other sessions, while if there is an 
effect due to one of the experimenters,  this 
should show up in  comparisons  involving 
the Pittsburgh  session run by that experi- 
menter. Contrary to  either of  these  hy- 
potheses, the first cell of Table 3 reports 
that  there  are  no  significant differences 
among  the six pairwise  comparisons  of these 
four sessions. 
When we compare the data for a given 
round from different sessions in this way, 
we are of course looking  at smaller  samples 
than when we pooled the data for a given 
round from all sessions in each country,  as 
in Table 2. Therefore,  one issue we need to 
consider is whether the lack of significant 
differences in  the  Pittsburgh sessions, in 
contrast to  the  significant  differences be- 
tween countries,  might be due to the small 
sample sizes. Table 3 addresses  this by re- 
porting  the results of pairwise  comparisons 
between the unpooled round-10  bargaining 
data from all sessions in all countries.  Note 
first  that, except in Yugoslavia  where one of 
the sessions was significantly  different  from 
the other two, there are no significant  dif- 
ferences between sessions from the  same 
country.  The one Yugoslav  session that dif- 
fers from the others also differs  from three 
of  the  U.S.  sessions. Otherwise, the  be- 
tween-country  differences by sessions mir- 
ror the between-country  differences  pooled 
across  sessions. 
So  far  we  have  concentrated on  the 
round-10  data. Looking  back at the compar- 
ison of rounds 1 and 10 given in Figures 3 
and 4, we see that the differences  between 
countries appear to increase from round 1 
to round 10: the modal offer in round 1 is 
500 in every country,  whereas by round 10 
the modal offer has shifted to 400 in Israel 
and Japan (which has a  second mode of 
450), while in the United States and Yugo- 
slavia the round-10 mode remains at 500. 
Table 4 confirms  this impression  and shows 
that the differences between the distribu- VOL. 81 NO. 5  ROTH ETAL.: BARGAINING AND MARKET  BEHAVIOR  1087 
TABLE  4-PROBABILITY  MEASURE  Ap  OF  DIFFERENCE  BETWEEN 
COUNTRIES'  BARGAINING,  BY  ROUNDS 
Round  US-YU  US-JA  US-IS  YU-JA  YU-IS  JA-IS 
1  0.099  0.051  0.365  -0.038  0.271  0.264 
2  0.042  0.330  0.446  0.313  0.429  0.076 
3  -0.217  -0.022  0.221  0.139  0.438  0.192 
4  -0.153  -0.031  0.178  0.122  0.329  0.207 
5  0.132  0.169  0.505  0.015  0.422  0.364 
6  0.332  0.301  0.575  -  0.014  0.364  0.364 
7  0.091  0.243  0.530  0.160  0.486  0.368 
8  0.133  0.321  0.604  0.218  0.527  0.331 
9  -  0.054  0.161  0.496  0.259  0.590  0.377 
10  0.099  0.360  0.695  0.302  0.703  0.479 
Notes: US = United  States,  YU  =  Yugoslavia,  JA  =  Japan,  and  IS =  Israel. 
tions of proposals  by bargainers  in different 
countries, as measured by Ap = P{x > y} - 
P{y > x}, tend to increase as the bargainers 
gain more  experience. Although this  in- 
crease is not monotonic, the difference in 
the last round  is greater  than the difference 
in  the  first round in  every comparison, 
except  between  the  United  States  and 
Yugoslavia,  where it is constant (which is 
consistent with our general finding of  no 
significant differences between those  two 
countries'  data). 
This is confirmed  by a simple regression 
model Ap = ,0  + ,fn  + E which gives an es- 
timate  of /8 that is positive  in all six compar- 
isons. In the test of the hypothesis /8 = 0 
against 8 > 0, the three comparisons  involv- 
ing Israel  are significant  at conventional  lev- 
els (0.001  in two cases and 0.01 in one), and 
the comparisons  of Japan with the United 
States and Yugoslavia  have significance  lev- 
els of 0.055 and 0.095, respectively.  For the 
United States and Yugoslavia,  /8 is not sig- 
nificantly  different  from  zero (P = 0.26).  (All 
tests passed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test 
for the normality  of the residuals.) 
Another perspective on  the  differences 
between bargaining behavior in  different 
countries comes from looking not at pro- 
posed prices, but at acceptances  and rejec- 
tions. We first look at overall disagreement 
rates in each country  (i.e., the percentage  of 
all offers that are rejected, without condi- 
tioning  on the offer).  Table 5 presents  these 
TABLE  5-REJECTION  FREQUENCIES  IN  BARGAINING,  BY  ROUND  AND  COUNTRY 
United States  Yugoslavia  Japan  Israel 
Round  Frequency  Percentage  Frequency  Percentage  Frequency  Percentage  Frequency  Percentage 
1  6  22  8  27  7  24  8  27 
2  7  26  6  20  11  38  6  20 
3  10  37  7  23  10  34  8  27 
4  12  44  9  30  10  34  8  27 
5  12  44  10  33  9  31  7  23 
6  7  26  10  33  10  34  8  27 
7  7  26  11  37  4  14  9  30 
8  3  11  10  33  9  31  6  20 
9  7  26  9  30  8  28  3  10 
10  5  19  7  23  4  14  4  13 
Total:  76  28  87  29  67  22  83  28 1088  THE  AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
figures for rounds 1-10. The clear pattern 
within each country,  that higher offers are 
accepted more frequently  than lower offers 
(see Fig. 5),14 is not mirrored at all when we 
compare countries where offers are high 
(the  United  States and Yugoslavia) with 
those where they are low (Japan  and Israel). 
Over all  rounds, the  disagreement rates, 
which are 28 percent, 29 percent, 22 per- 
cent, and 28 percent, respectively,  are cer- 
tainly  not rising.  At round 10, the disagree- 
ment rates of  19 percent, 23 percent, 14 
percent, and 13 percent are actually lower 
for the two low-offer countries. (However, 
we can only speculate  whether  the relation- 
ship among  these last-round  rates is robust, 
since the  disagreement rates fluctuate so 
widely  between  rounds.) 
A  more detailed comparison of  accep- 
tances and rejections  between countries  can 
be made by considering  how often the pro- 
posal of  a given price is accepted. These 
comparisons  are slightly  complicated  by the 
facts that the  number of  proposals of  a 
given  price is different  in different  countries 
and that observed  rates of acceptance  fluc- 
tuate widely for offers that were observed 
only rarely.15  However,  the underlying  pat- 
tern is clear, as is demonstrated  by Figure  5. 
The curves for each country  represent the 
percentage of  acceptances for each price 
that was proposed  at least 10 times (over all 
rounds).  Each cell of Figure  5 compares  the 
resulting  curves  for a pair of countries,  and 
these comparisons  mirror  those concerning 
the distribution  of proposals.  In each case, 
the country  with the lower distribution  of 
offered prices has a higher rate of accep- 
tance for each proposed  price.  Thus,  we see 
that the acceptance  rate in Israel for each 
offer is higher  than the corresponding  rates 
in the United States,  Yugoslavia,  and  Japan, 
while the  acceptance rates in  Japan are 
higher than those in the United States and 
Yugoslavia.  Only in the comparison  of the 
United States and Yugoslavia  do we have 
two acceptance-rate  curves such that the 
one that begins  consistently  lower ends con- 
sistently  higher. 
Given that different offers are accepted 
with different  probabilities,  it is natural to 
ask, for each country,  what is the expected 
payoff to a buyer from making  a particular 
offer. Since the behavior  of the bargainers 
changes from round to round,  this is some- 
thing of a moving  target. Nonetheless, Fig- 
ure  6  presents the  curves based on  the 
pooled data from all rounds  in each country 
for all offers that were made at least ten 
times. Thus, for example, if a buyer pro- 
poses a price of 300, he will earn 700 if it is 
accepted  and  0 if it is rejected.  In the United 
States, the price 300 was proposed 15 times 
and accepted four times (26.7 percent), so 
on  average the  proposal earned  (700  x 
0.267)  =  186.9, which can be read from the 
graph  for the United States  in Figure  6. It is 
instructive  to compare these graphs to the 
modal offers observed  in round 10 in each 
country  (in Figs. 3 and 4). The modal offer 
in the final round  in both the United States 
and Yugoslavia is  500, which is  also the 
proposed price that maximizes a  buyer's 
average earnings in  these  countries. The 
modal offer in the final round in Israel is 
400; here too, this is the price that maxi- 
mizes a buyer's  average  earnings.  Finally,  in 
Japan there are two modal offers in round 
10, 400 and 450, and the latter maximizes  a 
buyer's average earnings. Thus, by round 
10, the buyers seem to be adapting  to the 
experience  of the prior rounds  in a manner 
roughly  consistent  with simple  income-maxi- 
mization.  (The same cannot be said of the 
sellers, who continue to reject low positive 
offers.) Of course, since we have observed 
that subjects  are changing  their behavior  as 
they gain experience, the  round-10 offers 
may not meet with the same average re- 
sponses as in the earlier  rounds,  and to the 
extent that this is the case, there is reason 
14The  increasing  acceptance  rate  of  higher  offers 
within each country is not completely monotonic,  and 
in  fact  a  small  "kink"  is  visible  in  each  country's 
acceptance-rate  curve, which  may possibly indicate  a 
small bias related to whether offers are made in round 
numbers of tokens. 
15For example, if a particular price is proposed only 
once,  the percentage of acceptances will be either  100 
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to believe  that the process has not yet con- 
verged by round 10.16 
III. Discussion 
Both the market and bargaining environ- 
ments  chosen  for this experiment  have ex- 
treme  perfect-equilibrium  predictions,  in 
which  one  player  receives  all  the  benefit 
from the transaction. Nevertheless,  the mar- 
ket  sessions  exhibited  a  vigorous  conver- 
gence  to  equilibrium  that  was  robust  to 
subject-pool differences and transaction val- 
ues.17 
In contrast to  the market sessions, the 
bargaining  sessions did not show any ten- 
dency toward  the equilibrium  prediction  in 
any  of the subject  pools. Furthermore,  there 
were clear differences in the outcomes of 
bargaining  in different  subject  pools. These 
differences cannot be attributed  simply to 
variations among inexperienced subjects, 
since they  grew  larger  from  round  1 to round 
10, as the bargainers  gained  experience  with 
the game and with each other. 
The  out-of-equilibrium  behavior in  the 
bargaining  game is consistent with the be- 
havior  that has been uniformly  observed  by 
experimenters  who have looked at ultima- 
tum-bargaining  games of this kind, starting 
with the paper by Guth et al. (1982). Prom- 
inent in the discussion  of this phenomenon 
has been the idea that bargainers'  concep- 
tions of fairness  might be an important  ex- 
planatory variable, particularly  insofar as 
such conceptions  might explain  the propen- 
sity of  bargainers in  the  position of  the 
second mover to reject positive offers (see 
Guth and Tietz [1990],  Prasnikar  and Roth 
[1991], and Roth [1992] for discussions of 
this literature).  The relationship  observed  in 
this experiment  between offers and accep- 
tance rates in different subject pools can 
help  distinguish between  alternative hy- 
potheses about  how ideas about  the fairness 
(or "reasonableness")  of different  proposals 
might account  for these subject-pool  differ- 
ences. 
One hypothesis  is that the different  sub- 
ject pools share a common  idea about what 
constitutes  a fair or reasonable  proposal  (an 
obvious candidate is the fifty-fifty  proposal 
of 500) and that the difference  among sub- 
ject pools is in something  like their aggres- 
siveness  or "toughness."  In this view, buyers 
in more aggressive  subject pools would be 
more inclined to  take advantage of  their 
first-mover  position to try to obtain more 
for themselves than might be  considered 
fair. That is, such a buyer  would recognize 
that a fifty-fifty  split is  "fair," but would 
seek to take more. However, if aggressive- 
ness is a property  of the subject pool, the 
sellers  would share  it and  would  presumably 
be less inclined to accept unfair  offers than 
16In an ideal world, we would at this point compare 
the  experienced-bargainer  sessions  we  conducted  in 
each country. Instead, we have a cautionary tale about 
the difficulty of maintaining common procedures (and 
consequently  experimental  control)  in  an  experiment 
conducted  in  four  countries.  Despite  our  efforts  to 
remain in  almost  constant  contact  by electronic  mail 
when  the  experimental  sessions  were  in  progress,  in 
this aspect of  the  experiment our coordination failed. 
In Yugoslavia, the  experienced  subjects had all taken 
part  in  the  same  previous  bargaining session  (which 
turns out  to  have been  the  one  Yugoslav  bargaining 
session  whose  results  were  different  from  the  other 
two), while  in  the  other  three  countries,  experienced 
bargainers were recruited from all three prior sessions. 
Furthermore, in Yugoslavia and the United  States, the 
final  experienced  bargaining  encounters  occurred  in 
the 20th round, while in Israel and Japan the sessions 
ended  after the  10th round (with a subsequent experi- 
enced  session  in Japan lasting for  20  rounds). These 
procedural inconsistencies,  together with the fact that 
we have many fewer experienced sessions than inexpe- 
rienced sessions, make the comparisons of these groups 
less reliable than we would like. Consequently, we will 
simply note that the pooled data from all rounds of the 
experienced  bargaining in each  country are consistent 
with the between-country differences we have reported 
above.  The  experienced  data  also  suggest  that  the 
evolution  of  behavior  noted  above  from  round  1 
through round 10 may continue  to evolve. However, a 
further  exploration  of  these  issues  must  await  more 
data. 
17The strength of the forces pushing buyers to pro- 
pose  prices that gave them zero profit can perhaps be 
better appreciated by noting that buyers in the market 
sessions appeared to find the experience quite frustrat- 
ing. It was not  uncommon, when  subjects were  being 
individually paid at the end of each session,  for some- 
one  to  ask why all the  other  buyers had behaved  so 
foolishly. (When asked about his own bidding behavior, 
such a buyer would typically respond that the  actions 
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less aggressive sellers in other subject pools. 
Under  this  hypothesis,  high  rates  of  dis- 
agreement would be associated with subject 
pools  in which  offers  are  low.  This  is  not 
what we observe.18 
Instead,  the  subject  pools  where  offers 
are  low  (Japan  and  Israel)  do  not  exhibit 
any higher rates  of  disagreement  than  the 
high-offer subject pools.  This  suggests that 
what varies between  subject pools  is not  a 
property  like  aggressiveness  or  toughness, 
but  rather  the  perception  of  what  consti- 
tutes  a reasonable  offer under the  circum- 
stances. That is, suppose  that in all subject 
pools it seems reasonable for the first mover 
to ask for more than half the profit from the 
transaction  and  that  what  varies  between 
subject pools is how much more seems rea- 
sonable.  To  the  extent  that offers tend  to- 
ward what is commonly regarded as reason- 
able,  and assuming that offers regarded as 
reasonable are accepted, there would be no 
reason to expect disagreement rates to vary 
between subject pools, even when offers do. 
Our  data  thus  lend  some  support  to  the 
hypothesis that the  subject-pool differences 
observed  in  this  experiment  are related  to 
different  expectations  about  what  consti- 
tutes  an  acceptable  offer,  rather than  dif- 
ferent propensities  to  trespass on  a shared 
notion of what constitutes such an offer. 
This brings us to the question of whether 
such  differences  can  be  attributed  to  cul- 
tural  differences  between  subject  pools, 
where for an operational definition of "cul- 
tural" we  mean  differences  that cannot  be 
attributed to variables other than the nation 
in  which  the  data  were  gathered.  As  we 
have  already  indicated,  there  are  uncon- 
trolled differences in subject pools (such as 
differences  in  military  service)  that  must 
make  any  such  attribution  speculative. 
However,  the  experiment  was  designed  to 
control  for  those  variables that  seemed  to 
us  to  be  potentially  most  troublesome, 
namely,  currency,  experimenter,  and  lan- 
guage effects. To the extent that the experi- 
mental  controls were  adequate,  the  results 
indicate  that  the  subject-pool  differences 
cannot  be  attributed  to  any of  these  vari- 
ables.19  Consequently,  we  offer  the  con- 
jecture  that  the  observed  subject-pool  dif- 
ferences  are  cultural  in  character.  Such  a 
conjecture  must  stand  or  fall  on  the  re- 
peatability  and  robustness  of  these  results 
and  on  the  extent  to  which  similar differ- 
ences  among  these  countries  can  be  ob- 
served  in  related  economic  environments. 
In this connection,  and in view  of  the  dif- 
ficulty  of  controlling  for  between-country 
variables, laboratory experimentation seems 
to us to offer the possibility of focusing on 
some kinds of cultural differences in behav- 
ior  that  cannot  be  studied  in  any  other 
way.20 
Finally, we consider what implications the 
results of this experiment have for the ongo- 
ing  assessment  of  the  extent  to  which  dif- 
Another way to make more or less the same point 
about  the  "toughness  hypothesis"  is  to  note  that we 
are sometimes  asked in which country the bargainers 
proved to be the toughest. Our data suggest that this is 
not  a  well-posed  question,  in  the  sense  that  the 
"toughest" buyers are found in the  same place as the 
least tough sellers. 
19Recall, however,  that  the  control  for  translation 
differences built into our design provides only an upper 
bound on how great an effect might be due to linguistic 
factors.  In  particular,  if  the  differences  observed  in 
bargaining behavior are due to translation differences, 
they must be due to differences too  small to have had 
an  effect  on  the  market  behavior.  Given  the  robust 
convergence  to  equilibrium  observed  in  the  market, 
one  might conjecture that it would take large transla- 
tion differences indeed  to affect market behavior, and 
in  this  case  there  is  a  possibility  that  the  observed 
bargaining  differences  might  nevertheless  be  due  to 
differences  in the  translations, rather than to subject- 
pool differences. While such a possibility is not entirely 
ruled out by the data, we are skeptical that the bargain- 
ing differences are primarily linguistic in origin. 
OAt  the  same time,  to the  extent  that experiments 
control for extraneous variables by eliminating much of 
the  natural  context  in  which  negotiations  may  take 
place,  there  are aspects of cultural differences in bar- 
gaining behavior that cannot be studied in the labora- 
tory. For example,  differences  such as how and when 
negotiations  begin  and  end  or  how  disagreement  is 
expressed  may  involve  important  cultural  differences 
that  can  only  be  observed  in  the  natural  context  of 
negotiations; and of course, critical features of a nego- 
tiating  environment,  such  as  the  legal  framework in 
which negotiations  take place, are important between- 
country variables  that  influence  the  outcome  of  bar- 
gaining  in  natural  contexts  but  are  deliberately  ex- 
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ferent  game-theoretic  predictions  may  be 
descriptive  of  observed  behavior.  Diverse 
opinions  on  this  subject  have  been  ex- 
pressed in the experimental literature. 
Our evidence  lends  little  support to  the 
view that perfect-equilibrium predictions are 
not at all descriptive of observable behavior 
or to the view that they are only descriptive 
when  they  are  not  extreme.21 Equilibrium 
prices are clearly reached in the markets we 
study,  even  though  the  equilibrium  is  so 
extreme  that  the  buyers  who  find  them- 
selves  proposing  these  prices  earn  nothing 
or next to nothing. 
At the same time, the failure of observed 
behavior  in  the  bargaining games  even  to 
approach the equilibrium prediction (and in 
particular  the  readiness  of  sellers  in  that 
game  to  earn zero  by rejecting offers  that 
would  give  them  positive  earnings)  raises 
questions  about  the  auxiliary  assumption 
under  which  the  equilibrium  predictions 
were  made,  namely,  that  the  players  are 
attempting  to  maximize  their  earnings.22 
However,  if  players  are  not  attempting  to 
maximize  their  earnings,  then  why  do  the 
equilibrium predictions made under that as- 
sumption for the market games do so well? 
Preliminary discussions with various investi- 
gators in this area suggest at least two possi- 
ble  explanations.  One  is that  the  observed 
bargaining behavior  is  dominated  by  con- 
cerns  about  fairness  which  are  context- 
dependent  and do  not  arise in the  market 
environment. Another is that whatever non- 
monetary concerns enter bargainers' prefer- 
ences  do  so  in both  environments, but the 
competitive  pressure toward equilibrium in 
the  market overwhelms any such factors in 
players' preferences.23 
Whether or not nonmonetary factors play 
a role  in  either  or both  environments,  the 
results of  this experiment lend  strong sup- 
port  to  the  hypothesis  that  the  different 
outcomes  observed  in  these  two  environ- 
ments  result  from  different behavior  away 
from the equilibrium. This helps explain the 
relation  between  the  equilibrium  predic- 
tions and the observed bargaining and mar- 
ket behavior. To see why this is so, we need 
to  compare  these  two  games  once  again, 
both from the point of view of the  equilib- 
rium predictions and the observed behavior. 
From the point of view of the equilibrium 
predictions,  the  two  games  are  similar  in 
that both predictions give one player 0, but 
they are dissimilar in that it is the buyer in 
the market game who is predicted to get 0, 
while  the  buyer in  the  bargaining game  is 
predicted  to  get  1,000.  This  dissimilarity 
largely disappears when we look at observed 
behavior.  In  the  market  sessions,  a  buyer 
who  proposes  the  equilibrium  price  cer- 
tainly will earn 0; but a buyer who proposes 
the equilibrium price in the bargaining will 
earn  0 with  very high probability, because 
21See, for example,  Matthew  Spiegel  et  al. (1990), 
who review evidence from sequential bargaining games 
from a variety of subject pools, for a recent suggestion 
that the degree of inequality in the equilibrium payoff 
division may be the decisive element in determining its 
descriptive ability. 
22See Ochs and Roth (1989) for a discussion of the 
consistency  of  this  kind  of  disadvantageous  rejection 
among a number of bargaining experiments; see  Gary 
Bolton  (1991)  for  a  model  in which  a player's utility 
depends both on absolute and relative earnings and for 
a  carefully conducted  series  of  experimental  tests  of 
that model. 
23These competitive  pressures  need  not  be  due  to 
simple  income-maximization. For example, consider  a 
hypothetical  buyer  whose  preference  for  equality  is 
such that his first-choice outcome would be to have all 
buyers submit identical bids of $5 (or $1) and who bids 
accordingly in the first two rounds. When he sees  how 
high  the  actual  transaction  price  is,  he  becomes  an- 
noyed with the other buyers, and (with the same moti- 
vation  that  would  have  caused  him  to  express  his 
displeasure by rejecting too small an offer if he were a 
seller  in  the  ultimatum game)  he  decides  to  become 
the  high bidder in round 3 in order to  deprive other 
buyers of  the benefits of what he sees  as their unrea- 
sonable  behavior.  The  point  in  considering  such  a 
hypothetical  buyer  is  to  observe  that  in  the  market 
game  his  nonmonetary  preferences  cause  him to  be- 
have  in  a  manner indistinguishable  from  an  income- 
maximizer, while  in  the  ultimatum  game  his  prefer- 
ences  lead  away from  the  equilibrium predicted  for 
income-maximizers. The difference lies not in the pref- 
erences,  or in the "social norms" elicited by the game 
which these  preferences  may reflect, but in how such 
preferences  interact in the different games and in the 
outcome  that  emerges.  (The  above  example  is  from 
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low  offers were  accepted only with  low 
probability  (Figs. 5, 6). Despite the similar- 
ity of actual  payoffs  at the equilibrium  offer, 
the payoffs  away  from the equilibrium  pro- 
posals are quite different. In the  market 
sessions, a buyer  who consistently  proposes 
a price of  500, say, will earn 0  in  every 
round; but a buyer who consistently pro- 
poses a price of 500 in the bargaining  ses- 
sions will with high probability  reach an 
agreement  in every round and will receive 
$5 (or $15, 10 shekels, 1,000  yen, or 200,000 
dinars, depending on which session he  is 
in). Thus, buyers  in both environments  earn 
little or nothing when they make equilib- 
rium proposals,  but in the markets  we ob- 
served, buyers also earned nothing when 
they  made  nonequilibrium  proposals, 
whereas buyers in the bargaining  sessions 
could maximize their earnings by moving 
substantially  away  from  the equilibrium  pro- 
posal (see Fig. 6). 
This conclusion  is similar  to that reached 
in Prasnikar  and Roth (1991), on the basis 
of comparisons  between some of the U.S. 
bargaining  data considered here with an- 
other two-player game in which the  first 
player  was (also) a proposer  and the second 
an accepter/rejecter.24  In that game, as in 
the bargaining  game, the equilibrium  pre- 
diction gave almost nothing to the second 
player,  but unlike the bargaining  game, first 
players  who deviated  from equilibrium  were 
not rewarded.  After players gained experi- 
ence with this game, the'  observed  behavior 
converged  to equilibrium. 
In all these games, the behavior of the 
first  mover  is well accounted  for by applying 
standard game-theoretic  analysis, together 
with the (usual)  assumption  that first  movers 
are income-maximizers,  to  the empirically 
observed behavior of  the  second mover. 
However, in the bargaining  game, the be- 
havior  of the second movers  (i.e., the sellers 
who refuse positive offers) cannot be  ac- 
counted for by a standard game-theoretic 
model built on the usual auxiliary  assump- 
tion  of  income-maximization.  Therefore, 
Figure 6  suggests that the buyers in  the 
bargaining  games adapt to  the  "nonstan- 
dard"  behavior  of the sellers  in a "standard" 
game-theoretic  way. Thus, these data sug- 
gest to us that, while the problem  of devel- 
oping  descriptively powerful  theory  for 
games of this sort does not call for anything 
like the wholesale abandonment  of the ap- 
paratus  of game theory, neither is it likely 
that game-theoretic  analysis  unaided  by em- 
pirical  observation  will lead to reliable  mod- 
els of behavior. 
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